Why are you on Facebook? by Vergnolle, Suzanne
Why are you on Facebook?
Suzanne Vergnolle 2021-11-01T10:04:25
The NGO None Of Your Business (noyb) recently made public a draft decision sent
by the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) to other European Data Protection
Authorities under the GDPR’s cooperation mechanism. This draft decision is part
of an ongoing investigation assessing Facebook’s data protection practices which
started more than three years ago.
On May 25, 2018, an individual acting through the association noyb filed a complaint
against Facebook’s updated Terms of Service and Privacy Policy. The complaint
alleged that Facebook relied on “forced consent” to process personal data (§ 2.8 s.)
and argued the company did not specify which legal basis it relied on for each of its
processing operations (§ 2.10). Designated as the lead authority for this case, the
Irish DPC was charged with the investigation. The Data Protection Commissioner
Helen Dixon analyzed the dispute through “the lawfulness of the personal data
processing and the transparency of the information provided,” identifying three
specific issues (§ 2.23) necessary to address the complaint:
• First, whether acceptance of the Terms could and should be considered as
consent to the processing,
• Second, could Facebook lawfully rely on contracts as a basis for its processing,
• Third, did Facebook provide the requisite information to the data subjects
regarding the legal basis of the processing and whether it did so in a transparent
manner.
Many points of this draft decision are interesting and could be discussed at length,
including Dixon’s interpretation of the information requirement (§ 5.1 s.), the
very brief analysis on the damage suffered by Facebook’s users (§ 9.18), or the
determination of the amount of the fines (§ 9.1 s.). Nonetheless, we will limit our
discussion to the analysis of the second issue, namely whether or not Facebook
could rely on the contractual legal basis for certain purposes of its processing,
including for behavioral advertising. If Facebook cannot rely on the contractual legal
basis, it will probably have to rely on user consent, which is substantially harder to
get under the GDPR (and is less given by the users).
Facebook’s legal basis for data processing
The DPC starts its analysis by stating that Facebook did not rely or intend to rely
on the legal basis of consent to process personal data under its Terms of Service
(§ 3.12), nor that it had to (§ 3.16 s.). On the contrary, the DPC considers that “in
many cases involving a contract between a consumer and an organization, the lawful
basis for processing is the necessity for the performance of the contract” (§ 3.18).
I personally agree with this interpretation, especially since the Article 29 Working
Party and then the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) have been restricting
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how the necessity clause should be interpreted. According to the EDPB, this
necessity clause “must be interpreted strictly and does not cover situations where
the processing is […] unilaterally imposed on the data subject by the controller.”
Thus, the key issue was to determine if behavioral advertising should be considered
as necessary for the performance of the social network contract. If considered
necessary, Facebook could rely on the contractual legal basis for its processing. If
not, Facebook would have to rely on another legal basis to justify its data processing
(probably consent).
Surprisingly, Commissioner Dixon asserts that behavioral advertising is “the core of
Facebook’s business model and the core of the bargain being struck by Facebook
users and Facebook” (§ 4.41). Her interpretation of the GDPR’s legal basis is based
on a few elements that will be successively discussed.
Facebook’s core service
Intuitively, personal advertising does not appear “strictly necessary” to perform a
social networking activity. Indeed, a social network is frequently defined as “an online
service or site through which people create and maintain interpersonal relationship”.
It is mainly a way to connect with other people and not a place where individuals
typically come to receive behavioral advertising. Besides, Facebook’s motto is
“connect with friends and the world around you on Facebook”, and not “connect with
friends and receive advertising tailored to your tastes.”
However, Commissioner Dixon considers that “personalized advertising
constitutes the ‘core’ of its service, and would therefore be the Facebook service’s
‘distinguishing characteristics’” (§ 4.39). She goes on to say that “as the core of the
bargain between the parties, this advertising […] appears to be part of the substance
and fundamental object of the contract” (§ 4.43). According to Commissioner Dixon,
“a reasonable user would be well-informed […] that [personalized advertising] is
the very nature of the service being offered by Facebook and contained within the
contract” (§ 4.39). Based on this interpretation, it appears that Facebook’s users are
on the social network not to connect with their friends and family but rather to receive
personalized advertising.
More precisely, because Facebook’s Terms of Service explicitly refer to ads and
sponsored content as being part of the contract (§ 4.37), Commissioner Dixon
appears to consider that the practice should fall into the scope of the contract. Two
arguments strongly object to this interpretation. First, “the fact that the purposes
of the processing is covered by contractual clauses drafted by the supplier will not
automatically mean that the processing is necessary for the performance of the
contract” (EDPB, Opinion 4/2017, § 52; EDPB, Guidelines 2/2019, § 57 s.). Thus, the
fact that Facebook refers to ads and sponsored content in its Terms of Service does
not make them automatically fall inside the contractual necessity standard. Also, and
most importantly, a company claiming something in its Terms of Service does not
make it legal or fair.
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Indeed, European union law and Member States laws protect consumers against
unfair standard contract terms. Based on these principles, a French court ruled
in 2019 many provisions of Facebook’s Terms of Service were unfair or illegal, in
particular, terms relating to behavioral advertising (which at the time of the complaint
– 2014 – was  based on the consent of the user). Although Commissioner Dixon
does not represent a court and has no power to control the fairness of contractual
terms (which she emphasizes multiple times in her draft decision, see § 4.13), her
analysis favors what is written in the Terms of Service instead of what could be
considered fair for Facebook’s users and the handling of their personal data.
Facebook’s business model
Commissioner Dixon invokes Facebook’s business model as another argument
in favor of considering behavioral advertising as the core of the contract between
Facebook and its users (§ 4.44). It is described as “the provision of data on personal
activity to facilitate targeted advertising” (§ 4. 46). However, it is unclear why the
company’s business model should be considered as an element when assessing the
bargain between the company and its users. This reasoning could have dangerous
consequences and could be used to justify some of the worst practices. To illustrate:
since applying labor laws to drivers could hurt the business model of mobility service
companies, drivers should be qualified as independent contractors and courts should
not re-qualify them as employees. We are left wondering if data protection rules
should be twisted to allow predatory business model.
Paying with your personal data to access Facebook
Commissioner Dixon’s reasoning seems to fully endorse the principle that when
a service is free, users can be required to “pay” for it with their personal data (§
4.41). This idea has agitated the data protection community for a long time, and the
GDPR does not provide a clear answer. At first glance, article 7 § 4 of the GDPR
seems to ban contracts establishing a link between the consent of the subject
and the provision of a service. However, the wording leaves some flexibility since
article 7 § 4 requires that the “utmost account shall be taken” when assessing the
consent. Also, this article relates to consent requirements and its articulation with
the acceptance of a contract remains unclear. Commissioner Dixon’s interpretation
could be considered as a first taste of the idea that personal data can be “counter-
performance” or consideration of a free service, which is one interpretation of article
3 of directive 2019/770 on contracts for the supply of digital content and digital
services.
Final words
One last effect of Commissioner Dixon’s reasoning remains unanswered. How the
data minimization principle (GDPR, article 5 § 1 c) can still apply in this context?
Personalized advertising is per se based on a massive collection of personal data.
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If this type of advertising is the core of the bargain between Facebook and its users,
what are the limits relating to the collection of personal data of Facebook’s users?
If Commissioner Dixon’s interpretation is to be upheld by other Data Protection
Authorities (which is doubtful), noyb will probably challenge it in front of an Irish
Court, which may refer some questions to the European Court of Justice. A few
years are still lying ahead before a definite legal answer provided to the complainant
and European Facebook’s users.
Asides from the legal considerations, if Facebook’s core service is to provide you
with personalized advertising, do you really want to stay on Facebook?
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